By Scott Newark
Now that the electoral dust has settled, several pressing security policy issues will likely re-emerge on the radar screen when the newest Harper Cabinet is sworn in any day now. Foremost among these is the need for improved co-ordination in national security activities. This was a topic of considerable discussion in Ottawa’s security and enforcement circles pre election and while the Conservative election platform did speak of the need for “effective coordination” in a promised new ‘National Counter Terrorism Strategy”, the substantive details have yet to be discussed.
That being so, a review of what’s required and why is timely.
When it comes to security related matters, co-ordination of activities is an essential element of success. This is so because the subject matter involved frequently involves both the private and public sector, all three levels of government and multiple inter connected infrastructures or activities. Put differently, notwithstanding the wishes of some for a single, all powerful, government entity that is in charge of everything, that’s not reality and nor, thankfully, is it ever going to be. That does, however, create challenges.
The desire for a conscious co-ordination role has been expressed repeatedly since 9-11 by critical infrastructure operators and emergency responders whose responsibilities epitomize the multi agency, multi jurisdictional Canadian environment. While the federal government publicly endorses the concept of co-ordination, the tangible results are less impressive. It has been noted on more than one occasion that having the federal Department of Public Safety proclaim its ‘leadership’ on critical infrastructure protection and emergency management issues is not the same thing as actually assuming the responsibility for the co-ordination and the institutional accountability should the co-ordination not occur.
The broader issue of enhancing co-ordination of national security activities was a part of the current Government’s 2006 security and criminal justice election platform when it proposed creating a National Security Commissioner to provide recommendations to Government on how to accomplish defined inter agency co-ordination. Despite impressive progress in completing other action items from this agenda, this important national security co-ordination issue remains unaddressed.
The subject was also vigorously addressed at great length in June 2010 in the Air India report from Justice Major where the creation of an enhanced National Security Advisor was recommended. Not surprisingly in light of the origin of the review, it recommended a fully funded, Privy Council Office based National Security Advisor with operational responsibilities including resolving and reconciling intelligence gathering with criminal evidence gathering. This was bluntly rejected by the government in December 2010 as an inappropriate creation of yet another bureaucracy.
Less noticed, but potentially more significant, was a recommendation from Justice Major that the proposed National Security Advisor could also serve as both an experience based security policy generator and an accountability mechanism for agencies and departments tasked with national security responsibilities. Although less grandiose than what has been described as a national security “czar”, this concept merits close examination because effective accountability enhances performance and targeted reforms can have immense systemic ramifications.
A National Security Coordinator of this nature would benefit from a clear mandate to ensure assigned agency and departmental responsibilities are carried out and that interagency co-ordination is accomplished as intended. The mandate should also include identifying problems to coordination of efforts, like claimed legal restrictions on information sharing, and reporting of non performance by agencies or departments assigned national security related responsibilities so their senior officials can be required to explain their inaction.
An office with such a precise co-ordination mandate should not require significant expenditure and the source for any funding should come from reallocation of existing expenditures rather than ‘new’ funding. Funding reallocation will be the new reality in Ottawa given the commitment to reduced spending so this would be a good place to start.
It is interesting to contemplate how this approach might assist in our ongoing deficiencies in relation to an effective government wide and industry cyber security strategy or creating clear requirements, including who does what, for operators of critical infrastructure protection and providers of emergency management services. An entity with a clear ‘report back’ role might have already resolved why Canada still has no modern ‘bad guy’ lookout system deployed at our ports of entry despite a 2006 Government commitment to do so and despite three years of ‘study’ by CBSA and the RCMP.
Knowing that a substantively qualified and informed body has an obligation to report deficiencies, foot dragging, risk aversion decision making and outright non performance might also go a long way to delivering fully resourced border related services like the Shiprider program and an intelligence led, joint force, mobile border patrol. It might also ensure funds allocated for border security are spent on border security so we don’t end up closing ports of entry in Quebec to save money while spending border funds to build gazebos and repave sidewalks.
A National Security Coordinator so empowered and supported by representatives from defined Agencies and Departments would also be a natural forum for identification and potential resolution of inter Agency ‘difficulties’ especially when the failure to do so results in reporting ‘up’ rather than the toleration of the status quo. For this reason, the National Security Coordinator should either report to the PM’s National Security Advisor within the Privy Council Office free from any departmental filters, or directly to the Minister of Public Safety.
This model is admittedly less than what was contemplated by Justice Major. By making coordination a measurable deliverable rather than a note on a power point presentation, that may, however, produce more tangible results. Such a National Security Coordinator would not have a direct operational role other than by making sure others discharged theirs and to identify when and why should that not occur. Accordingly, the National Security Coordinator’s office would have a dual responsibility to ensure national security directions from Government are carried out or reported back and to serve as a reporting “up” mechanism on problems that need to be addressed including new issues entirely.
Canada has a long and relatively successful history of joint force operations on law enforcement related matters. In light of our experiences, positive and negative, it’s time to enhance that capacity through a National Security Coordinator with a defined follow up and reporting mandate.
The effectiveness of such an entity will actually lie in its simplicity and mandate to report on success and failure. As with everything else in government, and especially now with a majority government, there will have to be support for such a function at the highest political level or it will exist in name only which is actually counter productive. Real leadership, however, recognizes that consciously reporting and acknowledging non performance is among the best ways to ensure it doesn’t happen in the first place.
Scott Newark has a thirty year career in criminal justice, law enforcement and security policy matters and is a regular contributor to iPolitics on criminal justice and security issues.
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